The Amsler Integrator and the Burden of Calculation by McGee, David
The Amsler Integrator and the Burden of Calculation 
DAVID MCGEE* 
Résumé Abstract 
On accuse souvent les architectes navals 
britanniques des xvilf et XIXe siècles de ne 
pas avoir adopté d'approche scientifique à la 
construction des bâtiments maritimes. L'arti-
cle que voici explique cette « omission » en 
menant enquête sur le cadre et la culture des 
méthodes de conception navale. Il s'attarde 
notamment aux liens entre la production de 
plans, le calcul scientifique et l'avènement de 
l'intégrateur d'Amsler. La production de dessins 
avec mesures a permis d'effectuer des prévi-
sions. Néanmoins, ces calculs longs et fastidieux 
apportaient si peu qu 'on y recourait rarement. 
L'intégrateur d'Amsler promettait de soulager les 
concepteurs de ce «fardeau ». Sorte d'ordina-
teur mécanique introduit dans les années 1880, 
cet appareil a diminué de beaucoup le temps 
qu'il fallait pour calculer la stabilité d'un navire 
et rendu possible l'application des principes 
scientifiques à la construction navale. 
British naval architects of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries are often accused of fail-
ing to take a scientific approach to shipbuilding. 
This article explains this "failure" through an 
investigation of the context and culture of ship 
design practice, focusing on the relationship 
between plan drawing, scientific calculation 
and the advent of the Amsler Integrator. Mea-
sured plans drawings made predictive 
calculations possible. But calculations were so 
extremely long and tedious for so little gain 
that they were very rarely made. The Amsler 
Integrator promised to relieve designers of this 
"burden." A form of mechanical computer 
introduced in the 1880s, the integrator dra-
matically reduced the time it took to calculate 
a ship's stability and thus promised to make the 
application of science to shipbuilding a prac-
tical possibility. 
A recent display at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology included a nicely symbolic 
arrangement of two artifacts from the Hart Nau-
tical Collection. On the bottom of the display 
case was a body plan showing multiple cross-
sections of a merchant steamer from the 1890s. 
On top of the plan was an Amsler integrator, a 
mechanical instrument capable of calculating 
the areas and moments of the cross-sections in 
the drawing, which in turn allowed a calcula-
tion of the vessel's curve of stability. Nowadays, 
as a form of mechanical computer, the integra-
tor looks rather quaint. At the time the 
instrument was introduced it was hailed as one 
of the greatest developments in nineteenth 
century naval science. 
This article seeks to unpack the reasons for 
this claim as a way of investigating a story 
about science in British shipbuilding that those 
interested in ship design will often have 
encountered. Frederick Robertson gave classic 
expression to it in his This Evolution of Naval 
Armament of 1921, describing the supposed 
lack of science in British naval architecture as 
the "greatest blunder of two centuries," leaving 
ship design in the hands of craftsmen who 
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could do no more than "grope" their way for-
ward on the basis of "blind lore" and "dogma," 
held back by "hereditary principles" and "cau-
tious timidity." More recently, historian Stanley 
Sandler has written of the craft "rule-of-thumb 
system that had served the Royal Navy so 
badly." Historian of science A. Rupert Hall has 
argued that French investigations of ship sta-
bility and resistance were ignored by British 
shipwrights because of the "anti-theoretical 
conservatism of British shipyards." Similarly 
Pollard and Robertson, in their extremely influ-
ential work on nineteenth-century British 
shipbuilding, have faulted British shipbuilders 
for failing to adopt scientific methods, 
connecting this failure to the ultimate decline 
of the British shipbuilding industry in the twen-
tieth century.1 
Most accounts of this sort revolve around the 
assumption that because we now employ sci-
entific theory on an immense scale in design, 
it must have been useful in the past, and there-
fore those who failed to take a scientific 
approach are to be regarded as at best craftsmen, 
and at worst conservative laggards. What most 
commentators have not done, however, is 
stand in the shoes of earlier ship designers and 
ask themselves if there might not have been a 
real problem. 
By investigating the significance of both 
measured ships ' plans and the Amsler 
integrator, in this paper I hope to show that 
nineteenth-century naval architects faced very 
real difficulties in trying to apply scientific the-
ory to ship design. My overall strategy is 
contextual and it will be necessary to take a long 
view. I begin by showing how and why 
measured plans came to be the central instru-
ments of design in naval architecture and the 
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essential foundation for the application of 
quantitative scientific theory to the design of 
individual vessels. Next, focusing on the theory 
of stability, I show how the attempt to apply 
mathematical physical theory to a ship's plan 
was hampered by the complex of problems I 
refer to collectively as the "burden of calcula-
tion." One part of this burden was that 
calculations of stability were extraordinarily 
long and complex but offered surprisingly 
little guidance to the designer. A second part 
was that, because the calculations were so long 
and complex, they required the employment of 
an expensive, mathematically-trained profes-
sional staff, and this necessity ran directly 
counter to the demands for economy in the 
drawing office. 
As we shall see, nineteenth century naval 
architects regarded the Amsler integrator as a 
tremendous breakthrough precisely because it 
promised to solve both these problems, sim-
plifying calculations of stability to the point 
that they could be carried out by apprentice 
boys and girls instead of expensive profes-
sionals. On this basis, they believed the 
integrator would open a new era in the scientific 
approach to naval architecture by permitting the 
practical application of scientific theory to mer-
chant shipbuilding for the first time. 
Drawing and Design 
To begin establishing a context for the Amsler 
integrator, it will be important to explain two 
fundamental features of wooden ship design in 
the period 1800-1870. The first is the crucial 
role of measured plan drawings in warship 
design and construction, but not merchant 
building. The second, discussed in the following 
Fig.l 
A measured ship's 




Universal Dictionary of 
the Arts, Sciences and 
Literature (London, 
1819). Top right, the 
sheer plan or elevation. 
Bottom right, the top or 
half-breadth plan. Top 
left, the body plan. 
(Courtesy Hart Nautical 
Collection, MIT, and the 
Burndy Library, Dibner 
Institute for the History 
of Science and 
Technology) 
section, is the tremendous degree of uncer-
tainty about the behavior of ships that dogged 
innovations in hull forms.2 
Figure 1 shows the kind of plans in use in 
naval architecture around 1800, as illustrated 
in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.3 Above right 
is the side elevation or "sheer plan." Below the 
line of the keel in the side view is the top or 
"half-breadth" plan which, because ships are 
symmetrical around their axis, shows only half 
the vessel. In the upper left is the "body plan," 
showing multiple cross-sections of the hull at 
regular intervals along its length. The outside 
lines of the body plan represent the widest 
point of the vessel's hull. The lines to the right 
and left of centre represent multiple cross-
sections tapering towards the stem and stern. 
Each line also represents the shape of an actual 
frame whose location along the keel is shown 
by the straight, perpendicular lines in the other 
two drawings. Importantly, the three views con-
stitute measured plans, a fact indicated by the 
scale found at the bottom of each drawing. 
As might be obvious, these plans determined 
the overall form of a ship's hull. But it is not so 
obvious that they also contained the informa-
tion necessary to determine the dimensions of 
all the thousands of timbers, beams, knees, 
frames, etc., out of which the hull was built. The 
dimensions of these parts were derived from the 
plans in the dockyard, where parts of the draw-
ings were first laid out at full-scale on the 
"mould loft" floor. Then extremely compli-
cated geometrical procedures were applied to 
derive the dimensions of individual parts as 
necessary.4 Templates were made to fit the full-
scale manipulations and issued to the dockyard 
workers, whose task was to cut the timbers 
exactly to match. 
The plans shown in Figure 1 were the result 
of two centuries of refinement of a representa-
tional technique originally introduced by 
English Master Shipwright Matthew Baker circa 
1586.5 The date is significant because it was dur-
ing the time of Elizabeth that the introduction 
of shipboard cannon made it necessary for the 
state to bear the enormous expense of a per-
manent fleet and a permanent dockyard 
establishment. As is well known, Elizabeth and 
her successors were chronically short of funds. 
This indicates that the appeal of Baker's meth-
ods lay in the fact that they promised a great 
savings in warship construction.6 
How the use of plans led to economy can be 
understood by imagining the "craft" construc-
tion of a warship without the use of detailed 
drawings and templates, in which case the 
thousands of pieces that made up a hull had to 
be individually cut and shaped until they all fit 
together. This kind of cutting and fitting is 
inherently wasteful of materials, since each 
part must start out oversize and then be reduced 
to fit. Cutting and fitting is also inherently time 
consuming because of the care with which the 
parts must be gradually adjusted to each other. 
Moreover, the process is labour-intensive 
because of the high level of skill with which the 
shaping of parts must be carried out in order to 
avoid excessive waste. In other words, building 
warships by craft methods is inherendy expen-
sive. By contrast, the use of plan drawings 
allows a specification of the dimensions of parts 
in advance of fabrication. Specifying dimen-
sions in advance allows a reduction in the 
waste of materials. It also allows a division of 
labour in which different pieces of a ship can 
be made by different people yet still fit together. 
In turn this division of labour allows an increase 
in the rate of production, since parts that would 
take a single craftsman several days to make can 
be made at the same time. In short, the use 
of plans leads to savings in time, labour 
and materials. 
Recognizing that plan drawings were origi-
nally employed to save money in construction 
is important because it points to a feature of ship 
design that is often overlooked, namely the all-
pervasive influence of costs and the continual 
demand for economy. It also helps to explain a 
mystery in early modern naval architecture, 
which is that measured plans were used only 
in the construction of British warships after 
1600, and almost never in the building of 
wooden merchant vessels. Eschewing all talk of 
"dogma" or "conservatism," the explanation 
for this must surely be that merchant ship-
builders found their own techniques to be 
entirely adequate for their purposes — the 
making of money. This being so, there was no 
reason for them to invest in the design overhead 
required by the use of plans, meaning the main-
tenance of a permanent drawing office and the 
employment of expensive persons with the 
necessary drafting and mathematical skills. 
That is, if the reasons for the introduction of 
plans in the building of warships was to save 
money in construction in a context of high 
costs to the state, it seems that the context of 
costs and profits in merchant building simply 
did not necessitate a shift to the more elaborate, 
expensive and time-consuming methods of 
design used at the Admiralty. 
As we shall see, the pressure on commercial 
shipbuilders to keep design overheads low 
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continued fer into the nineteenth century and had 
an important effect on the application of science. 
Design and Uncertainty 
Recognizing that plan drawings were originally 
introduced to reduce the cost of constructing 
warships is also important because it points to 
the fact that ships' plans were fundamentally 
oriented towards problems of deriving the 
dimensions of parts and not to problems in the 
design of hull-forms. Most significantly, they 
failed to provide a means for overcoming the 
biggest problem in ship design, which was that 
each new design involved tremendous uncer-
tainties about the behavior of the resulting ship 
at sea. As it is directly related to the question 
of science in shipbuilding, a brief explanation 
of the reasons for this uncertainty will be 
of value. 
The place to begin is with the observation 
that warship designers in the age of wood had 
a very consistent list of the qualities desired in 
a sailing warship, according to which a good 
ship should sail well, sail into the wind, make 
little leeway, possess adequate stability, pitch 
moderately, and carry its guns high enough out 
of the water that they could be used in any 
weather.7 Early naval architects were also 
well-aware of the hull shapes needed to secure 
these advantages. They knew, for example, that 
fine lines aft gave better steering, that narrow 
ships with sharp entrances had greater speed, 
that greater breadth gave greater stability, a 
greater capacity to carry sail, and so on. But 
crucially, these designers knew that the dimen-
sions required to achieve the various desirable 
qualities conflict with each other in an ex-
tremely complicated manner and that there 
was no way to combine all the desirable quali-
ties in a single hull.8 
As John Knowles explained in his influen-
tial treatise on naval architecture of 1822: 
The properties which every ship ought to pos-
sess are, in a manner, subversive of, or in 
opposition to, each other. One figure is required 
for extraordinary swiftness, another for extraor-
dinary strength or capacity; and all are 
regulated, more or less, by peculiar and local 
circumstances. The great art, however, in all 
places and under all circumstances, consists, 
in so forming the body, that none of the desired 
qualities shall be entirely wanting.9 
But as Knowles emphatically concluded: 
"to unite, in one ship, all these desirable 
qualities, some of which are subversive of oth-
ers, is impossible."10 
The conflict between the qualities meant 
that naval architects had to choose which of the 
qualities they most desired and which they 
could sacrifice. This choice could only be made 
on the basis of the purpose of the vessel in 
question. Thus as Knowles explained, the first 
object in designing a ship was to "consider the 
various purposes that it is intended for, and 
the various impediments that it may meet with. " 
For only in light of the purpose could the ship 
be given the "arrangement of its parts and com-
bination of its principles; especially where it 
will be necessary that contradictory powers 
shall be blended together."11 
Every ship was thus a compromise. There 
was something "wrong" with each of them. 
But how wrong? Here the problem was the 
dimensions governing the various qualities 
interacted with each other in such an extremely 
complicated fashion that early warship design-
ers had no way of knowing precisely how 
obtaining one quality would affect the others. 
For example, a designer might change the lines 
of his plans to increase the beam of his vessel 
in an effort to increase carrying capacity. But he 
had no way of knowing precisely how this 
would affect speed, leeway or stability. Worse 
still, it turned out that even small departures 
from a previously successful design could ruin 
the performance of a new ship at sea. Indeed, 
one of the most frequently repeated stories in 
early modern naval architecture concerns sis-
ter ships, built to exactly the same plan, which 
had radically different sailing properties — one 
good, the other bad. The purpose of such sto-
ries was to stress the fact that even apparently 
trivial variations in design could result in such 
inexplicably large changes of behavior as to 
"wholly change the qualities of a ship from 
bad to good, or the reverse."12 
Given that they were building extremely 
costly vessels, carrying as many as eight hun-
dred men, where failure might have dire 
consequences for the'state, this kind of uncer-
tainty placed naval architects in the position of 
having to innovate in a context of enormous 
risks. Given these risks, it is not surprising that 
they often stuck as closely as possible to pre-
vious designs that were known to perform well. 
But by the same token, some means of pre-
dicting the future behavior of paper designs 
became highly desirable. And it is just here 
that the use of plan drawings presented an 
intriguing possibility — namely, the possibility 
of using mathematical physical theory to 
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Fig. 2 
Top: Stability diagram 
from Edward James 
Reed, A Treatise on the 
Stability of Ships, 
London, 1885. (Image 
from the author's 
collection). Bottom: The 
Captain's curve of 
stability. The line XZ 
represents the ship's 
stability with her poop 
intact, XB with poop and 
forecastle shot away. 
(Source: Minute of the 
First Lord with Reference 
to H.M.S. Captain, British 
Parliamentary Papers 
Vol. xlii, no. 254 (1871), 
p. 33. 
predict the future behavior of vessels at 
sea, and thereby eliminate uncertainty in 
ship design. 
Ships, Science and Burden of Calcula-
tion 
In turning to the discussion of the relationship 
between science and early ship design we are 
already in position to lay down two funda-
mental principles. The first may be stated as 
drawings first, then science. For if one stops to 
think about it, without the use of measured 
plans in design there could be nothing to quan-
tify and so no possible appl ica t ion of 
mathematical physical theory whatsoever. 
Moreover, without the use of measured plans 
to achieve accuracy in construction, there could 
be no point in applying scientific theory in 
design, since there could be no point in calcu-
lating the behavior of a "paper" ship if the real 
ship was going to be built and behave differ-
endy — certainly not when it is known that 
small alterations in design can produce large 
changes in a vessel's various qualities. 
The second principle is that what can't get 
into the drawings can't get into the ship, and 
this provides definite criteria for investigating 
the use of science in early naval architecture, 
for to be of any real benefit, the use of physical 
theory had to be capable of having some effect 
on the drawings, or else it would be largely 
irrelevant to the design of actual ships. 
Alas, this second possibility was closer to the 
truth. To see why, it will be necessary to under-
take a brief discussion of the theory of ship 
stability, the basic principles of which may be 
easily grasped with the aid of the diagram in 
Figure 2 (top). 
In essence, the theory of stability concerns 
the relationship between two mathematical 
points. One is the centre of gravity G, repre-
senting the centre of the weight of the hull of a 
ship and all that it carries, through which the 
force of gravity is considered to work down. The 
other is the centre of buoyancy B, representing 
the centre of gravity of the water displaced by 
the hull, through which the force of buoyancy 
works up. In the upright position of equuibrium, 
with the waterline at WL, these points are 
directly above each other in the centre line. 
But when a ship is inclined, the centre of buoy-
ancy moves away from the centre line to B' (as 
a result of the changing shape of the immersed 
part of me hull under the new waterline WL'). 
A "righting couple" is then formed by the force 
of gravity working down through G and the 
force of buoyancy working up through B, the 
leverage of which is proportional to the lever 
arm GZ. The amount of righting force tending 
to return the ship to its upright position is 
found by multiplying the length of GZ by the 
weight of the ship. 
Another important point to consider in the 
diagram is the theoretical point M'. This is the 
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the vertical line of the force of buoyancy work-
ing up through B' in the inclined position 
crosses the original centre line GB. The point 
has a double significance. In principle, the 
greater the height of the metacentre above G, the 
longer the lever GZ will be and the greater the 
righting force possessed by the ship. Secondly, 
it will be clear that as the ship inclines further, 
B' will change position and consequently so will 
M'. As long as M never passes below G, or G 
beyond M', there will always be some righting 
force. But if the metacentre ever passes below 
the centre of gravity, then it would also pass to 
the right of the centre of buoyancy B', forming 
a couple that will act to turn the ship over. In 
most cases, the higher M is above G, the less 
likely this is to occur. Thus a ship's stability was 
often expressed in terms of its "metacentric 
height," meaning the height of the metacentre 
above the centre of gravity. 
The basic principles of stability were origi-
nally put forward by French theorist Pierre 
Bouguer in 1746 and subsequently elaborated 
by such luminaries as Daniel Bernoulli and 
Leonhard Euler. These theorists often concerned 
themselves with the issue of metacentric 
height.13 In 1796 and 1798, however, English-
man George Atwood presented two papers on 
stability to the Royal Society of London show-
ing that although vessels of different form could 
have the same metacentric height at an initial 
angle of heel, one might possess no righting 
force whatever at a larger angle and would con-
sequently capsize.14 Since metacentric height 
was not always a safe guide, Atwood worked 
out detailed methods of determining actual 
righting forces.15 
By 1800, the situation was thus that the the-
ory of stability had been put on a more or less 
sound basis and that methods of calculating 
the stability of actual ships had been estab-
lished. Moreover, one can easily imagine the 
potential importance of calculating stability in 
the design of a sailing vessel, because the 
designer could, at least in principle, discover if 
his ship possessed the righting force necessary 
to resist the attempt of the wind in the sails to 
turn the vessel over. 
And yet, as commentators universally agree, 
between 1800 and 1860, stability calculations 
were almost never carried out in the design of 
actual ships. Now, this is easily explained in the 
case of wooden merchant vessels. Plans were 
not used in the design of merchant ships. Con-
sequently, stability calculations could not be 
made. But why weren't stability calculations 
carried out for warships, where plans were 
used, and where costs and risks were extremely 
high? Answering this question can bring us to 
an initial appreciation of the problems I refer to 
as the burden of calculation. 
The first problem was that the calculations 
necessary for determining stability at even a 
single angle of heel were extremely compli-
cated, immensely tedious and extraordinarily 
time-consuming. To determine the longitudinal 
position of the centre of gravity one had to 
divide the area of the waterline (represented in 
the half-breadth plan) into several sections of 
equal length, carefully measure the areas and 
moments of each of the sections in relation to 
a known reference line, then combine the 
results mathematically. To determine the verti-
cal height of the centre of buoyancy one had to 
repeat the procedure, this time working from a 
sheer plan divided into layers of equal height 
by successive waterlines. Finding the height 
of the centre of gravity was extremely tedious, 
because it required the calculation of the weight 
and centres of gravity of every single timber of 
the hull and every single thing to be carried on 
board — ballast, guns, stores, men, masts and 
so. These centres then had to be plotted with 
respect to a known reference point before they 
could be summed up. Once the centres of buoy-
ancy and gravity were located, the position of 
a new centre of buoyancy at some fixed angle 
of heel still had to be found, an operation car-
ried out on a diagram of the cross section of the 
ship at the location of the centres of gravity. 
Any more detailed discussion of stability 
calculations would be out of place here. Suffice 
it to say that according to one estimate it could 
take two years to calculate the stability of a 
vessel at a single angle of inclination using the 
methods available as late as I860.16 Entire ships 
could be built faster than this. 
If one element of the burden of calculation 
was thus the immense amount of time it took 
to calculate anything, a second was that the 
results gave almost no guidance to the designer 
on how to change his plans to correct difficul-
ties. This may already be obvious from the fact 
that a knowledge of righting forces at one angle 
of heel did not necessarily say much about 
righting forces at other inclinations. However, 
the analysis can be pushed farther. Say, for 
example, the designer believes his centre of 
gravity is too high and needs to be lowered. But 
the location of the centre of gravity is an extraor-
dinarily complex matter determined by the 
distribution of weights throughout the ship, so 
which lines in the plans should be changed to 
move it, and how much should they be 
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changed? Knowing the initial position of the 
centre of gravity says almost nothing about this. 
Similarly, the designer may not like the position 
of the centres of buoyancy. These are deter-
mined in an extremely complex manner by the 
overall form of the hull. Which lines in the 
plans should he move to change the form? 
Should the height of the sides be increased? 
Should the breadth be made larger or smaller? 
Where? In the middle portion of the hull? All 
along its length? And by how much should the 
lines be moved? 
In fact the decision on which lines to alter 
and how much to alter them could only be 
made on the basis of the judgment of the 
designer, acting in light of the purpose of the 
vessel. But how could a designer then be cer-
tain that the changes made actually gave the 
results desired? In principle, the only way to be 
certain was to re-draw the plans, re-calculate the 
weight of the ship, the positions of centre of 
gravity and buoyancy and so on. That is to say, 
achieving certainty though the use of quantita-
tive theory required the use of feedback loops 
of drawing, calculating and redrawing into the 
design process. If initial calculations were 
tedious and time consuming, subsequent loops 
added immensely to the tedium and delay. But, 
supposing that further problems were identified, 
the designer was then right back where he 
started, faced with the ugly prospect of redraw-
ing his plans and re-calculating all over again. 
Finally, it might be noted that even if a designer 
was crazy enough to complete several tedious 
feedback loops, this did little to achieve the 
overall goal of reducing uncertainty, not just 
because the designer would sooner or later have 
to stop calculating and trust his judgment, but 
because the designer adjusting lines to move 
centres of gravity and buoyancy was simulta-
neously altering the dimensions that governed 
all the other sailing qualities. In this way the 
attempt to reduce uncertainty about displace-
ment actually introduced uncertainties about 
the ship's other properties. 
The picture that emerges is that prior to 1860 
calculations of stability involved an enormous 
expenditure of time and energy for a very little 
benefit. But there was an additional problem 
that needs to be noticed. Calculations of stability 
required the employment of naval architects 
who were highly trained in mathematics and 
physics. Such persons commanded good 
salaries. But the ultimate objective of design in 
naval architecture was to reduce the costs of 
construction. Taking on the extra naval archi-
tects needed for lengthy calculations ran directly 
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economical a design staff as possible. 
This reluctance to carry the overhead of a 
large design department can clearly be seen in 
staffing levels at the Admiralty. There, the high 
cost of warships meant that many different 
kinds of calculations were carried out. Indeed, 
the Admiralty established various schools to 
provide a supply of designers with the neces-
sary mathematical skills.17 But considering that 
there might be dozens of ships building at any 
given time, numerous designs in hand and end-
less calculations to make, the design staff of the 
navy was extraordinarily small. In 1833, for 
example, there was only two official members 
of the Surveyor's Department. By 1860, the 
design staff at the Admiralty consisted of only 
eight souls: one surveyor, two assistants to the 
controller and five draughtsmen.18 There sim-
ply weren't enough bodies available to carry out 
lengthy stability calculations. Moreover, there 
was little point in adding bodies as long as the 
results gave so little guidance to designers in 
changing the lines of their plans. 
After 1860, there were two significant devel-
opments that need to be noted. The first took 
place in 1861, when Admiralty constructor 
Frederick Barnes devised ways to shorten cal-
culations of stability (although it is important 
to stress that Barnes's methods were still far 
from brief).19 The second development was 
graphical and involved no really new princi-
ples. It took place in 1867-68 when Admiralty 
constructors devised the calculation of curves 
of stability like the one in Figure 2 [bottom). 
What this curve represents can be under-
stood by returning to the image at the top of 
Figgure 2. There we saw that the righting force 
tending to turn a ship back to the upright posi-
tion is proportional to the lever arm GZ, whose 
length is determined by the position of the cen-
tre of gravity and the centre of buoyancy B'. 
As the ship inclines, the centre of buoyancy 
moves, and the length of GZ varies accordingly. 
What Barnes's method allowed for the first 
time was the practical possibility of calculating 
successive positions of B' and thus successive 
lengths of GZ. It is the successive lengths of 
the lever arm GZ that are plotted against 
the angle of inclination in the graph in 
Figure 2 (bottom). 
It will immediately be apparent that such a 
curve contains a mass of useful information 
when compared to a simple knowledge of meta-
centric height, or of righting forces at a single 
inclination. For example, the curve indicates the 
point at which all righting force vanishes, 
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something which had never been calculated 
before. It also shows the maximum point of 
stability, after which a ship suffers a declining 
ability to right itself. In this case the maximum 
occurs at only twenty-one degrees. Such infor-
mation allowed the designer to consider 
whether this was really safe, since the force 
of the winds might often push a sailing ship 
past this point. If the force of the wind steadily 
exceeded the maximum the ship would simply 
continue to turn over. Nothing could stop it. At 
the same time, a curve like this could tell 
the commander of such a ship when his 
vessel was in danger and allow him to take 
remedial action.20 
Here was a useful tool. And yet, even Admi-
ralty constructors did not immediately make the 
calculation of curves a matter of course. That 
this is so may be illustrated by explaining that 
curves of stability were originally devised in 
1867 in the context of a bitter public dispute 
over proposals to build ocean-going "moni-
tors," with main decks only four feet out of the 
water, but carrying a full spread of sails. Believ-
ing such vessels were dangerous, Chief 
Constructor of the Navy Edward Reed ordered 
his staff to use Barnes's methods to calculate the 
righting ability of such vessels at succeeding 
angles of inclination. The resulting curves were 
presented in public in 1868 and showed how 
ridiculously unsafe these monitors would be.21 
The proposal died. At the very same time, how-
ever, the Captain (designed by half pay naval 
officer Cowper Coles) was already being built. 
The only difference between this ship and the 
monitors was that the Captain's main deck was 
to be eight feet out of the water. It was therefore 
clear that this ship might also be unsafe. Not 
only did the Admiralty constructors fail to cal-
culate curves for the their own low-decked 
designs, they failed to calculate curves for the 
Captain until 1870, when the ship was already 
built and, in fact, at sea on a trial cruise. Exam-
ining the curve, Admiralty constructors 
predicted that the ship could capsize in certain 
circumstances. A few days later, on September 7, 
1870, the Captain capsized under precisely 
those conditions with gruesome loss of life. 
That Admiralty constructors failed to make 
use of their own curves of stability in the years 
1867 to 1870 is explained by the burden of cal-
culation. First, although Barnes's new methods 
reduced the time needed to calculate stability 
at single angles of heel, this was to a certain 
extent countered by having to calculate multi-
ple positions of the centre of buoyancy in the 
construction of a curve. Unfortunately, I have 
not been able to find any direct statement of the 
time required. In the case of the Captain, inclin-
ing experiments on the completed ship were 
carried out to determine the initial position of 
the centre of gravity, thereby eliminating the 
most tedious and time-consuming chore. Even 
so, it took two men one month to complete her 
curve. Secondly, though curves might reveal 
gross errors, they provided no more guidance 
on how to change the lines of plans than older 
calculations. Thirdly, there were only fourteen 
members on the Admiralty design staff at this 
time. They were so busy with their other respon-
sibilities that, except in unusual circumstances 
like those surrounding the Captain, they had 
no time to make lengthy calculations for so 
little guidance. 
It was only after the sinking of the Captain 
in 1870 that the calculation of curves of stabil-
ity for warships became the norm.22 We may 
note how late this is, considering that the basic 
principles of stability had been known for the 
better part of a century. 
Stability and the Cargo Steamer 
So far we have focused on the relationship 
between drawing and science in the design of 
naval vessels. The reason for this is that mea-
sured plans drawings were not employed in 
commercial practice for most of the period 1600 
to 1870. Hence science could only be applied 
to the design of warships. This situation only 
began to change with introduction of the use of 
plans in the construction of iron steamers in the 
early nineteenth century. Then came the begin-
nings of the "shipping revolution" in the years 
1860 to 1880, when metal, steam-powered cargo 
vessels finally proved themselves to be cheaper 
and more profitable to operate than wooden 
sailing ships. Metal ships began to take over the 
world's carrying trade.23 This had such a dra-
matic effect on British shipbuilding that by 
1881, of the 690 000 tons of the merchant ship-
ping building in Britain, only 30 000 tons still 
represented wooden vessels.24 
The shift is important because metal ship-
builders had to order such things as plates, 
brackets, and frames from iron and steel mills. 
To do so they had to have some way of speci-
fying the shape of parts in advance. It was thus 
in the first decades of the shipping revolution 
that the use of measured drawings became an 
established part of commercial shipbuilding 
practice and the two pre-conditions for the 
application of science to merchant vessels were 
finally in place. That is, merchant shipbuilders 
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were making extensive use of the kind of quan-
titative representat ions needed for the 
application of physical theory. And they were 
using plans to build ships accurately, meaning 
that completed ships closely resembled their 
"paper" originals, giving calculations a poten-
tial relevance. Naturally, as more and more 
metal cargo steamers were built, more and more 
were lost at sea. Many of these losses were 
traced to problems with stability. Ensuring ade-
quate stability came to be recognized as a central 
design problem.25 
The situation in the 1870s was thus that 
measured plans were in use, stability had been 
identified as a major issue, and methods of cal-
culation had been established. As Admiralty 
constructors William White and William John 
commented in 1871, "naval architects had simply 
to decide whether or not it was worth the trou-
ble to perform an elaborate calculation in order 
to ascertain the variations in the stability of 
any ship designed by them."26 The fact is, how-
ever, that commercial builders believed it was 
too much trouble. Calculations of stability in the 
design of merchant steamers were rarely made. 
To finish setting the stage for the Amsler inte-
grator, this needs to be explained. Explanation 
requires closer attention to the kind of problem 
that the stability of steamers represented. 
A key point is that the conditions of stabil-
ity in cargo ships are very different from those 
found in naval vessels. This is because a high 
proportion of the heavy weights to be carried 
in a warship — iron plates plating, beams, bulk-
heads, guns, armour, and the like — are of a 
fixed and permanent character, while the pro-
portion of movable or consumable weights is 
small. Accordingly, a warship on a cruise might 
use up hundreds or thousands of tons of coal 
but this was a only small fraction of the total 
weight of the ship and therefore did not dra-
matically affect the position of the centre of 
gravity. The stability of a warship was thus 
determined within limits of a very narrow 
kind.27 Accordingly, by 1880 it was considered 
sufficient to calculate curves for three condi-
tions: fully laden; fully laden with coals 
consumed; and light, with all coals, ammuni-
tion, and consumable stores expended.28 
The conditions of stability in cargo ships 
was radically different because the permanent 
weight of a steamer's hull was only a small 
proportion of the consumable and movable 
weights. In many cases, the weight of the hull 
was only a third of the total weight of coal, 
stores, and cargo. Unlike a warship, therefore, 
a cargo vessel on a voyage would use up large 
amounts of coal. The consumption of this 
weight would by itself seriously affect the posi-
tion of the centre of gravity, and so the ship's 
stability. Many ships were thought to have 
been lost for this reason alone. But in addition, 
the ordinary merchant vessel was required to 
carry cargoes of such different density as, on 
the one hand, pig-iron or steel rails, and on the 
other, cotton or tea. Merchants ships were 
thus liable, and likely, to be sent to sea at any 
draught between the extreme light and maxi-
mum load conditions. Their stability varied 
accordingly, then varied continuously as coals 
were consumed.29 
The point is that conditions of stability in a 
cargo vessel were actually much more com-
plex than those of a warship. Accordingly, it was 
considered desirable that curves be calculated 
for at least five conditions: the launch condition; 
finished but without cargo, coals or stores; fully 
loaded with coals, stores and cargo; fully loaded 
with coals consumed; and half loaded with 
coals consumed.30 That five curves might be 
needed brings us directly back to the burden of 
calculation. It will be useful, however, to sep-
arate the issues into two problems, one being 
the problem of design, the other the problem 
of operation. 
In design, the main job of die naval architect 
was to draw up the plans of a ship so that it 
could be built. The initial purpose of scientific 
calculations was to predict the future behavior 
of the ship so the plans could be corrected if 
necessary. Calculating one curve was a lengthy 
and tedious task. Calculating five represented 
an enormous effort. But, as before, the quanti-
tative results did not tell the designer precisely 
where and how to change his plans in order to 
correct a difficulty. If it was thought that the cen-
tre of gravity was too high, the designer might 
well try to reduce weights, but where he 
reduced weights remained a matter of personal 
judgment. In order to be sure that he had really 
corrected the problem and not created a worse 
one, the designer of a cargo vessel would in 
principle have to re-calculate all five curves — 
again an enormous effort. 
But because five conditions of loading had 
to be considered, it was in fact very difficult to 
determine what a "problem" actually was. The 
ship might be designed with a high centre of 
gravity and a limited amount of initial stability. 
But if the ship carried pig-iron that high centre 
of gravity might be in just the right place, since 
the iron would lower the centre of gravity and 
give a safe amount of stability. If the ship was 
designed with a low centre of gravity and there-
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fore a great deal of stability, that same cargo 
would lower the centre of gravity still further, 
producing an extremely long lever arm and huge 
righting forces, leading to extraordinarily vio-
lent motions that were themselves dangerous. 
In this way we can see that the choice in plac-
ing the centre of gravity was not determined by 
calculation, but a typical matter of compromise 
between conflicting requirements in ship 
design — in this case that the ship have proper 
stability when light as well as fully loaded. 
This brings us to the operational problem, 
which was elegantly explained in 1881 by Fran-
cis Elgar, a graduate of the navy's Royal School 
of Naval Architecture and later a professor of 
naval architecture at Glasgow. As Elgar put it, 
a ship built for a particular trade and for the 
purpose of carrying certain specific cargoes 
may be so designed as to be quite stable in all 
conditions while thus employed. But when 
vessels were built to dimensions fixed by own-
ers for general trading purposes, it was seldom 
possible for the designer to provide against 
instability arising in some possible or conceiv-
able circumstances of loading. The due 
preservation of stability in such cases had to be 
provided for by those who controlled the load-
ing. As Elgar elaborated: 
the naval architect can only control in the 
design about one-third of the total weight of the 
vessel and her cargo, leaving the remaining 
two-thirds in the hands of the owner, master, 
or stevedore. It is obvious, therefore, that what-
ever may be the qualities of the empty vessel 
in respect of stability, they may be greatly mod-
ified, or entirely altered, by the manner in 
which she is loaded. It is the loading to which 
we must look in the large proportion of cargo-
carrying steamers for the due preservation of 
such stability as is necessary for safety at sea.31 
This raised the possibility that stability cal-
culations made by the designer could have 
value after a ship was constructed by being 
placed in the hands of those who had to man-
age the vessel, the only difficulty being that 
the data had to be put in a form they could 
understand. We shall return to this issue when 
discussing the impact of the integrator. 
Before doing so, however, it will be neces-
sary to say that calculations of stability in cargo 
vessels represented an additional burden to 
merchant shipbuilders, which may again be 
explained in terms of the resistance of ship-
builders to employing a large and highly trained 
drawing room staff. Again, the problem was 
that calculations of stability required the 
employment of highly trained naval architects 
who commanded good salaries and we have 
already noted the reluctance to maintain a large 
design staff on the part of the navy. In com-
mercial building, where the goal was to make 
money, there was an even greater pressure to 
keep the size of the drawing office to a minimum. 
This pressure was felt even by leading firms 
like that of William Denny of Dumbarton, which 
had the largest drawing office of any private 
builder in the 1880s. But as Denny once 
responded to Admiralty constructor William 
White concerning new and shorter calculations 
of stability, White had missed the point, 
"because, with all deference to the Admiralty, 
that Department is noted for want of what we 
may call economy of highly-skilled labour. In 
a private shipbuilding yard we cannot afford 
such waste."32 
The need for economy in the commercial 
drawing office was not simply a matter of 
penny-pinching. It was directly related to what 
might seem like surprising conditions of the 
shipbuilding trade. In our own times, when a 
ship is ordered, the staff of the shipbuilder or 
else the staff of a professional consultant sets out 
to design it, taking a great deal of time to make 
all sorts of calculations. In the 1870s and 1880s 
the situation was completely different. Thus 
as William Denny once explained to the Insti-
tution of Naval Architects, the members of the 
Institution needed to understand that merchant 
builders had "not always time for performing 
even the primary one of these calculations; that 
very frequently we have, in contracting for a ves-
sel, to settle her general conditions and character 
within at least the limit of one day."33 On this 
point he was backed up by J. Inglis of A and J 
Inglis of Glasgow, who argued that the failure 
to perform stability calculations was not the 
fault of the shipbuilders, but really the result of 
a lack of interest on the part of shipowners. 
As Inglis explained: "The shipbuilder is not 
often consulted even with regard to the leading 
dimensions of the ship. He gets his printed 
specification, where everything is set forth, 
and his opinion is never asked as to whether 
the dimensions are good or bad for the pur-
pose intended."34 
If this was so of leading firms like Denny and 
Inglis, the more usual state of affairs may be 
illustrated by reference to the case of the 
Daphne, a small steamer of 1,000 tons built by 
the Scottish shipbuilding firm of Alexander 
Stephen and Sons. Launched on 28 July 1883, 
the ship no sooner cleared the ways when it 
turned over and sank, killing a number of the 
workers on board. The firm naturally wanted to 
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know why, but had not one single staff mem-
ber who was capable of investigating the ship's 
stability. They therefore hired Francis Elgar as 
a consultant. Elgar's curve of the Daphne's sta-
bility at the time of launch was only the second 
such curve ever calculated for a merchant 
steamer (the first having been computed by 
J. Harvard Biles for the Hammonia, which sank 
in similar fashion the year before). The results 
were startling because it had always been 
assumed that a ship of the standard form of the 
Daphne, with high sides and any initial stabil-
ity, would be safe to launch, whereas in fact the 
ship had so little righting ability that any small 
disturbance tending to incline her almost guar-
anteed she would then capsize.35 
What is more significant in the present con-
text is the state of affairs revealed by Sir Edward 
Reed's official enquiry into the sinking of the 
Daphne. For one thing, Reed discovered that 
Alexander Stephens and Sons had not designed 
the Daphne themselves. They had only 
contracted to build the ship to plans and spec-
ifications given them by the shipowner. In fact, 
it turned out that the plans and specification 
were drawn up for the owner by a marine engi-
neer possessing no training in naval architecture 
whatsoever. What the engineer had done was 
make a number of changes to the plan of a pre-
vious vessel, adding heavy, lifting machinery 
and deck houses to the superstructure, thereby 
raising the centre of gravity and compromising 
the Daphne's righting ability. Alas, the engi-
neer testified that it had never occurred to him 
to calculate the ship's stability. Moreover, he 
confessed he was incapable of doing so. 
The conclusion of the Daphne story is also 
significant because Reed exonerated Alexan-
der Stephens and Son on the grounds that what 
they had (or had not) done was absolutely stan-
dard practice in the industry and this finding 
helps to explain why most firms sought to econ-
omize on skilled drawing office labour — for 
what was the point of maintaining a large and 
professional staff to make stability calculations 
when plans and specifications arrived already 
prepared from the owner and had to be 
built to those specifications once the contracts 
were signed? 
Advent of the Integrator 
It is now time to turn to the advent of the 
integrator invented by Swiss mathematician 
Jakob Amsler (1823-1912). The son of a farmer 
who had studied mathematics and mathemat-
ical physics under Franz Neuman in Germany, 
Amsler completed his doctorate in 1848 and in 
1851 accepted a post at the Gymnasium in 
Scahffhausen, Switzerland. In 1854 he married 
Elise Laffon (thereafter changing his own name 
to Amsler-Laffon). The same year, in search of 
greater financial security, he turned his interests 
towards the construction of mathematical 
instruments and invented the polar planimeter, 
a device which could be used to measure the 
Fig. 3 
One of the later versions 
of the Amsler integrator 
in the Hart Nautical 
Collection at the MIT 
Museum (Courtesy Hart 
Nautical Collection) 
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areas of irregular curves. Previous planimeters 
had worked on the Cartesian co-ordinate sys-
tem and were both bulky and expensive. 
Working on a system of polar co-ordinates, 
Amsler's instrument was small, efficient and rel-
atively cheap. Some of his later papers 
concerned the application of the planimeter to 
problems in establishing proper gradients for 
streets, railways, canals and waterworks. Thus 
his intended market appears to have been the 
growing number of civil and mechanical engi-
neers faced with tedious problems involving 
irregular curves. He guessed right. More than 
50 000 planimeters were sold by Amsler's man-
ufacturing firm alone between 1857 and 1912.36 
The integrator was an extension of the 
planimeter, which could be used to calculate the 
statical and inertial moments as well as the 
areas of closed and irregular curves (Fig. 3). It 
was conceived by Amsler in 1855 as another 
useful tool for engineers but not specifically 
for naval architects. The general market for the 
instrument was relatively small. Only 700 inte-
grators were sold by his firm prior to Amsler's 
death in 1912, and the lack of a well-defined 
market may help to explain why it took Amsler 
until 1868 to produce an actual working model. 
Given that naval architects were already famil-
iar with the planimeter and very rapidly saw the 
value of the integrator once they discovered its 
existence, it appears that there were a number 
of technical problems with the early version and 
that these problems took Amsler another decade 
to solve. It was not until 1878 that the first 
properly working integrator was imported to 
Britain. The first extended notice of the instru-
ment in naval circles took place in 1880, when 
C. W. Merrifield presented a paper on the inte-
grator to the Institution of Naval Architects.37 
Extended discussion of the mathematical 
principles of the device will not be possible 
here, but those familiar with the mechanical cal-
culators of an age just gone by will be aware that 
it is possible to arrange mechanical gearwheels 
to carry out mathematical functions. In the old 
calculators, the gears were used to carry out the 
arithmetic functions of adding, subtracting, 
multiplying and dividing. In the Amsler inte-
grator, precisely calibrated gears and rollers 
were arranged to carry out the measuring and 
mathematical operations needed to find the 
areas, statical moments, and moments of iner-
tia of irregular curves. The various cross and 
longitudinal sections found in ships' plans were 
just the sort of irregular shapes the integrator 
was able to deal with. Moreover, the data about 
areas and moments obtained was just the kind of 
information needed to calculate a ship's stability. 
Arriving at the data for each section was a 
thing of incredible simplicity. The track for the 
instrument was laid down on the drawings and 
the instrument placed in the track. The pointer 
was placed on the drawing and readings were 
taken from the vernier scales attached to the 
cogwheels. The pointer was then used to trace 
the outiines of the irregular curve or section 
to be measured. The rollers turned the cogs, and 
new readings were taken from the scales. The 
initial readings were subtracted from the 
new readings. The results were then multiplied 
by a constant provided by the manufacturer. 
And that is all there was to it. In a few minutes 
the operator could know the area and moment 
of any section in the body, sheer, or half-breadth 
plans. The operation then had to repeated for 
the other sections. The resulting tables of 
areas and moments could then be combined by 
mathematical means to arrive at the location of 
the centre of buoyancy of the vessel in question. 
What is striking is how the relevance of the 
instrument to reducing the burden of calcula-
tion in merchant steamers was immediately 
recognized. Thus, the very first person to speak 
after Merrifield's paper of 1880 was naval con-
structor William White and his immediate 
judgment was that: "any one who is familiar 
with ship calculations must know that this is 
a thing for which we have been longing for 
years because it will save us an immense 
amount ofmere routine work." For the price of 
a few pounds, he continued, the instrument 
could not only be used not to make calculations 
of displacement, the position of the metacentre, 
and the centre of buoyancy, but also calculations 
for the much more informative curves of 
displacement and stability. Indeed, White 
concluded, "there will be no excuse now if 
the curves of every merchant ship are not speed-
ily calculated."38 
The discussion following Merrifield's paper 
was limited. Most of the audience had never 
heard of the integrator before. Two years later, 
however, J. Harvard Biles presented another 
paper to the INA, showing how relevant it could 
be to the design of cargo steamers.39 This Biles 
accomplished by presenting curves of stability 
for several steamers built by his employers, the 
Clyde shipbuilding firm of Jas. and George 
Thompson. The paper was accompanied by a 
specimen calculation of stability that demon-
strated the technique employed. Both the paper 
and the reaction to it focused directly on the 
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reduction of the burden of calculation that the 
integrator made possible. 
For instance, Biles reported that calculations 
made with the integrator were not only more 
simple, more accurate, and much shorter than 
those done by hand, but particularly stressed the 
fact that the work could be done by "compar-
atively unskilled labour." As proof he revealed 
that all the work of the curves he presented had 
been carried out by apprentices under sixteen 
years of age, whose only special qualifications 
were that they had been selected by competi-
tive examination for entry to his drawing 
office. In addition, Biles told his audience, the 
specimen calculation appended to his paper 
was "completed by one apprentice in twelve 
working days, this being only the second that 
he had done. Others have been since done in 
less than one half that time. The cost of this 
calculation for labour did not exceed ten 
shillings."40 The members of his audience were 
duly impressed.41 
The chief value of Biles's paper, however, 
was to show what the integrator could do with 
reference to the design problem facing naval 
architects, in the sense that rapid calculations 
now allowed the production of curves, and 
curves could reveal difficulties that were open 
to solution before a ship was built. One of the 
curves Biles presented, for example, was for the 
cargo steamer Thames. It showed that in the 
light condition this vessel actually had a neg-
ative righting force for the first 22 degrees of 
inclination. That is, if the ship was inclined for 
any reason, the couple formed by the centres of 
gravity and buoyancy would continue to turn 
the ship over. Not necessarily unsafe — the 
ship had been in operation for several years — 
these conditions did mean the ship had to be 
very carefully handled. In particular, as William 
Denny immediately pointed out, such a ship 
had to be so carefully loaded and unloaded 
that it spent much more time in port than other 
ships spent working.42 Furthermore, given her 
condition of stability, Denny argued the Thames 
could only take on the kind of deadweight car-
goes that kept her loaded centre of gravity as low 
as possible. But deadweight cargo was the least 
profitable a ship could carry.43 These were just 
the kind of problems that could be identified in 
the design phase with the aid of stability curves 
that the integrator now made possible. 
This being so, Denny went on to argue that 
using the integrator might help redress the kind 
of imbalance in the relationship between ship-
builders and shipowners seen in the case of the 
Daphne. As Denny put it, shipowners did not 
listen to shipbuilders when ordering vessels 
because they did not believe shipbuilders knew 
anything about making money in the carrying 
trade. That is why they ordered ships without 
bothering to consult the builder's opinion and 
why they were so thoroughly uninterested in 
hearing arcane talk about centres of gravity and 
curves of stability. The case of the Thames 
showed how the consideration of stability 
made possible by the integrator was directly 
related to operating profits. It was a clear case, 
Denny concluded, of scientific curves trans-
lated into money.44 
The Outbreak 
By 1882, shipbuilders had been alerted to the 
potential value of the integrator. Various naval 
architects working for different firms then set 
to work to perfect its uses. The result was what 
Sir Edward Reed referred to as a "notable out-
break of scientific development connected with 
die stability of ships" at the annual meeting of 
the Institution of Naval Architects in 1884.45 
The session saw no less than eight papers on 
stability, almost all of them focusing on the 
surpassing usefulness of die Amsler integrator 
in reducing the burden of calculation in the 
design and operation of cargo steamers. 
As before, a major theme was the surprise 
and in some cases astonishment at the remark-
able speed and simplicity of the calculations 
made possible by the instrument. Most of the 
papers demonstrated ways of making die cal-
culations even shorter. Unfortunately for our 
purposes, comparisons made with previous 
methods were often rather vague. No one gave 
a direct statement of how long it took to accom-
plish the same amount of work using the 
previously standard methods of Barnes. On the 
other hand, using an integrator in 1882, Biles's 
assistant had taken six days to complete the cal-
culation of a curve for one displacement of a 
ship. A. Amsler, the son of the inventor (who 
had been hired by Denny), now presented a 
specimen calculation showing that he could 
find die displacement and vertical position of 
the centre of buoyancy of a ship in two hours; 
the longitudinal position of the metacentre 
in another two; and a complete calculation of 
the curve of stability for a single displace-
ment in only eight hours.46 J. C. Spence 
announced that with his graphic methods he 
could find curves for all displacements in only 
three or four days.47 
Of great interest to the members of the ESTA 
was the presentation by William Denny of two 
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alternate methods of calculating what he 
believed to be brand new "cross curves" of 
stability, worked out independently by a 
Mr Fellows and a Mr Couwenberg of his own 
staff.48 Whereas in ordinary curves the righting 
arm was plotted against a changing angle of 
inclination for a single draught or displace-
ment, the idea behind the cross curves was to 
take a single angle of inclination, plot the right-
ing arm against changing displacement, then 
repeat the procedure for other angles of heel, 
thereby generating a wealth of information 
about the stability of the ship in various con-
ditions. According to Denny, Fellows's method 
saved one-half the labour it would have taken 
to develop the same information by ordinary 
means. As Fellows' cross-curves involved the 
calculations of stability for six draughts, at six 
angles, and thus thirty-six curves of areas and 
moments, this was no mean achievement. 
Couwenberg reported that when he first came 
to Denny's yard it took about three days to 
determine the righting levers of one inclina-
tion for five draughts. He was now able to do 
the same work in nine hours. The plotting often 
waterlines took eleven hours. Integrating them 
to get cross-curves took only an hour and a 
half. From the cross curves, he reported, he 
could derive curves of the ordinary type for 
any displacement in an hour and a half.49 
While shortening the calculations already 
contributed to economy in design, a second 
theme of the papers presented in 1884 was the 
way in which the integrator permitted further 
economies through the use of less skilled labour. 
Denny explained how the work of calculating 
curves was to be placed in the hands of the girls 
in his drawing office, freeing his more expen-
sive staff for fresh lines of investigation.50 Biles 
judged the relative merits of the two alternate 
methods of making cross-curves, not on the 
grounds of accuracy, but on the grounds that 
Mr Couwenberg's method entailed the use of 
new tracings for multiple inclined waterlines, 
which had to be drawn by skilled draughts-
men. In Mr Fellows' method, the integrator 
could be applied directly to the original body 
plan by unskilled labour, saving both time and 
money.51 In a similar vein, prominent naval 
architect MacFarlane Gray explained how he 
had worked out forms for the entry and calcu-
lation of readings from the integrator, "so that 
a boy can work them out without ever requir-
ing to understand the calculation." Indeed, in 
his opinion, greater accuracy was obtained by 
apprentices using the integrator than those 
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who actually had to think about what they 
were doing.52 
In all the discussions of 1884 it was taken for 
granted that calculations made with the aid of 
the integrator were applicable to the design of 
cargo steamers, where the problem had been 
that an ordinary steamer was likely to carry 
almost any cargo and therefore likely to go to 
sea at almost any draft, its stability varying 
accordingly. Assessing the possibilities therefore 
required so many calculations that they simply 
were not done. With the integrator, a large num-
ber of curves could be developed. The 
information did not tell the designer where to 
place his centres of gravity and buoyancy. As 
before, this remained a matter of choice and 
compromise. With the new data, however, 
designers could at least avoid obviously unsafe 
or unprofitable failures. It was also still the 
case that the eventual behavior of the ship 
would really be governed by the cargo and not 
the ships themselves. On this point it was rec-
ognized that the masses of data found in curves 
and cross curves were directly applicable to 
what was referred to above as the operational 
problem. The difficulty was in what form the 
information should be given to those in charge 
of a vessel. 
This difficulty was the subject of the paper 
by Francis Elgar, which served as the focus of 
discussion of the operational problem in 1884. 
As Elgar explained, the importance of stability 
in cargo ships had now been firmly established. 
The integrator allowed the multiple calcula-
tions of stability that were necessary. It was 
essential that the results be given to sea captains 
in order that they might operate their ships 
with safety. But he did not believe that that 
either ordinary curves or cross-curves would be 
of any practical value. In the first place: 
If mercantile steamers could always be loaded 
in an uniform manner it might be possible to 
represent their stability in all conditions with 
sufficient accuracy and completeness for ordi-
nary working requirements by means of a 
curve or curves; but as regards the vast bulk 
of merchant shipping there are no curves of 
stability which could possibly be constructed, 
except that for the absolutely light condition, 
which would be likely to represent the actual 
stability of a ship, except on a very few occa-
sions during the whole of her career.53 
In theory, this meant that sea captains would 
have to determine the conditions in which their 
ships were actually placed when loaded with 
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different cargoes. But they simply did not have 
"the technical training and experience which is 
requisite of them to understand and deal with 
metacentres, centres of gravity, and curves of sta-
bility; and to make allowances or constant 
variations in draught of water, and position of 
centre of gravity which the different cargoes 
they carry render necessary." It was therefore 
"hopeless" to expect either shipowners or 
shipmasters to use metacentric heights and 
curves of stability as a practical guide in 
stowage. Instead, if it was ever to be used, sta-
bility information had to be put before them in 
a simpler form.54 Accordingly, he proposed 
that calculations made by builders should be 
reduced to practical instructions, indicating 
how high certain kinds of cargo should be 
stowed, in what place on what deck, what bal-
last should be carried with what loads and so 
on. This would appear to leave gaps in the con-
tinuum of different conditions to be accounted 
for. But Elgar was convinced that a captain's 
practical knowledge of his ship would take 
care of the difficulties and that "the proper use 
of stability calculations is not to supersede or 
interfere with that knowledge of a vessel's qual-
ities which may be gained by experience, but 
to supplement and complete it in certain cases 
where it may be necessary."55 
So many other speakers at the 1884 session 
referred to the applicability of the integrator to 
reducing the time necessary for stability calcu-
lations, to the economy of labour, and to both 
the design and operational problems of steam-
ers that it would be tedious to repeat them all. 
It will, however, be worth noting the apprecia-
tive assessment of Sir Edward Reed. As he put 
it: "we happen to be living at a time when sta-
bility calculations have become a necessity on 
an enormous scale, and to supply them would 
have been at once difficult and expensive 
beyond limit if it had not been for the advent, 
so to speak, of this mechanical assistant."56 
Conclusion 
This paper began with the claim that an inves-
tigation of the significance of measured ships' 
plans in combination with the Amsler integra-
tor could lead to an explanation for the widely 
perceived lack of science in nineteenth-
century British shipbuilding. I have not 
attempted to argue that British naval architects 
were often more scientific than they get credit 
for, though a case could certainly be made. 
Rather I have tried to show that there were very 
real difficulties in the way of applying mathe-
matical physical theory to problems of ship 
design at this time. 
Crucial to my explanation of these problems 
is an understanding of the role of measured 
plans in shipbuilding, which were originally 
introduced as a means of reducing the costs of 
construction in contexts where economy was 
the overriding objective. These plans deter-
mined the shape of ships but did not solve 
problems concerning innovation in hull-forms, 
particularly the uncertain behavior that could 
result from the blending of conflicting qualities 
to meet the purpose. On the other hand, mea-
sured plans provided the foundation for the 
application of science in ship design, because 
they provided the kind of quantitative repre-
sentation needed for predictive calculations. 
In this connection, we may note that the pur-
pose of science in shipbuilding was not to serve 
as a source of innovation. Nor could theory be 
used to deduce the proper shape of ships. Its 
purpose was to check innovations in the shape 
of ships already arrived by other means and pre-
cisely embodied in detailed plans. 
That the relationship between scientific the-
ory and actual ships was mediated by the use 
of plans is an important point because without 
plans, use could not be made of predictive sci-
entific theory. By the same token, theory had to 
be brought into a fruitful relationship with 
plans in order to have any real value. That is, 
it could be quite possible to build up a body of 
scientific theory. But if it could not be brought 
into an effective relationship with the plans, 
such a body of theory, for all its promise, was 
essentially useless in the design of individual 
vessels. Thus as scientifically minded naval 
architect Gabriel Harvey remarked in 1826: 
"The first mathematician in Europe may spec-
ulate forever on the forms of floating bodies; 
he may multiply his analytical combinations, 
and pile his highest order of integrals on each 
other; and yet, when called upon to make his 
practical applications, his formulae almost 
lose their identity, and all his golden specula-
tions vanish."57 
Stability provides a case in point. By 1800, 
an impressive body of theory had been estab-
lished — indeed, after displacement, this was 
the only theory concerning floating bodies estab-
lished on more or less correct principles. 
Moreover, means of applying the theory to 
ships' plans were available. And yet, between 
1800 and 1860, government naval architects 
(who had good reasons to do so) rarely if ever 
calculated the stability of their designs. Between 
1861 and 1870, they neither made ordinary 
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calculations of stability in design nor made a 
habit of calculating the more useful curves of 
stability. Similarly, between 1870 and 1880, 
commercial builders failed to compute the sta-
bility of cargo steamers, despite the existence 
of sound theory, and despite the fact that they 
were now using plans to build ships. 
These puzzling delays in the application of 
the science of stability are explained by the 
complex of interrelated problems I have referred 
to as the burden of calculation. In the first place, 
calculations were extremely long and compli-
cated. Secondly, although the results might 
reveal potential difficulties, they gave very lit-
tle guidance on how to change the plans to 
correct the difficulty. Changes still had to be 
made by eye, which called for feedback loops 
of re-drawing and re-calculating, but as long as 
the calculations took so long for so little guid-
ance, there was simply little practical value in 
making them. Thirdly, calculations required a 
highly trained staff of mathematically trained 
professionals. This added greatly to the expense 
of design at a time when there was a great resis-
tance to increasing the costs of shipbuilding 
through the employment of large design staffs. 
While all this was true of the navy, the burden 
for commercial builders was even greater, partly 
because of the greater numbers of calculations 
they had to make, but also because of conditions 
of trade in which designs were often given to 
them by shipowners. There was often no time 
for calculation and thus little financial reason 
to maintain a staff capable of making them. 
The factors go a long way towards explaining 
the perceived lack of science in nineteenth-
century British shipbuilding. But they also help 
to explain the reaction of shipbuilders to the 
Amsler integrator. It promised to shorten 
calculations to the point where the multiple 
curves of stability needed to address the design 
and operational problems of commercial ship 
design could be produced. Further, it permitted 
calculations to be made by relatively "inex-
pensive persons" and thus helped to overcome 
the economic burden of calculation in mer-
chant practice. 
Nevertheless, one must be cautious in claim-
ing the integrator led to any "revolution" in 
the application of science to ship design. 
Edward Reed produced his Treatise on Stabil-
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ifyin 1884, the first such treatise in the English 
language. In it he made large claims for the 
value of the instrument, particularly for its 
application to the design of merchant ships, 
his goal being to promote the professionalisa-
tion of commercial shipbuilding, and the 
instrument did become a standard piece of 
equipment in merchant ship design. Indeed 
the Hart Nautical Collection possesses a photo 
of the dozen or so integrators used by the stu-
dents of MIT's school of naval architecture 
opened in 1893 — a proud display of raw com-
puting power at the time. Nevertheless, there 
were problems in the way. 
One of these was that as the cost of both 
warships and steamers increased, so did the 
need for more, and more accurate calculations. 
On this score, although some calculations were 
better than none, designers came to be con-
cerned about the accuracy of results obtained 
with the assistance of the integrator.58 Secondly, 
those interested in promoting the naval science 
with the help of the integrator after 1884 — 
Reed, White, Elgar, Biles, Denny, Spence, and 
others — were almost all associated with the 
Institution of Naval Architects or trained at the 
navy's schools of naval architecture. In the navy, 
the battle for naval science had already been 
won, and more work needs to be done on the 
influence of the Institution of Naval Architects 
on British shipbuilding practice. But Pollard 
and Robertson have shown that only 23 of the 
166 students who completed the course at the 
Royal School of Naval Architecture ended up 
working for private firms between 1864 and 
1904.59 Thus it cannot be claimed that the 
advent of the integrator created a sudden 
demand for naval science in commercial ship-
building. 
Instead it would appear that the contextual 
conditions of the shipbuilding trade remained 
much the same. Builders continued to receive 
many of their designs from shipowners and 
were forced to contract for ships of known form 
in such a short period of time that extended cal-
culations were impossible. This meant they 
could not afford to maintain professional staffs. 
The burden of calculation remained too high.60 
Indeed, it might be claimed that the burden 
only really began to be lifted with the advent 
of the electronic computer in our own times. 
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